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Taxpayer Disclosure and Penalty Laws
Author(s) -
Beck Paul J.,
Davis Jon S.,
Jung WoonOh
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1097-3923.00038
Subject(s) - taxpayer , audit , payment , agency (philosophy) , revenue , business , economics , internal revenue , public economics , actuarial science , accounting , finance , marketing , service (business) , macroeconomics , philosophy , epistemology
The consequences of a penalty exemption available to U.S. taxpayers who disclose aggressive reporting positions is examined via a game theoretic model. Results indicate that (i) the tax agency's expected revenue collections (net of audit costs) decline under the disclosure exemption, and (ii) the impact of disclosure regulations depends on the taxpayer's type. Of particular interest, we find that taxpayers who are likely to prevail on an uncertain issue decrease their expected payments although they do not disclose in equilibrium. The impact on the amount of resources absorbed by the tax collection process is also examined.