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A Democracy Principle and Strategy‐Proofness
Author(s) -
Campbell Donald E.,
Kelly Jerry S.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/1097-3923.00021
Subject(s) - social choice theory , mathematical economics , economics , democracy , microeconomics , computer science , law , political science , politics
In some social choice applications we want more than one alternative to be selected in some situations. This allows the construction of strategy‐proof social choice rules that are not dictatorial. But if we also require x alone to be selected if it is at the top of some ordering that is submitted by more than half of the individuals then the rule cannot be strategy‐proof. We prove this for rules that sometimes select one alternative, and sometimes two, but never more than two.