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Does Administrative Corporatism Promote Trust and Deliberation?
Author(s) -
Öberg Perola
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/0952-1895.00197
Subject(s) - corporatism , deliberation , negotiation , intermediation , representation (politics) , political science , work (physics) , public administration , public relations , law and economics , sociology , business , law , politics , mechanical engineering , finance , engineering
How corporatist arrangements actually work has not been empirically demonstrated, despite the theoretical focus on interest intermediation. This article investigates whether corporatism affects trust and deliberation in state activities, using Swedish public administration as a case study. First, it is doubtful that corporatism directly promotes trust among citizens, but it very likely promotes trust within and between the represented organizations. Second, interest–group representation cannot be understood as a process of strict delivering of positions adopted in advance. Preferences are often transformed in discussions where other interests are involved. Furthermore, the case investigated here shows that the decision–making process within a corporatist arrangement resembles deliberation, rather than negotiations between “contesting interests.”