Premium
The Guardian State: A Comparative Analysis of Interest Group Regulation
Author(s) -
Yishai Yael
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/0952-1895.00064
Subject(s) - interest group , state (computer science) , public interest , scope (computer science) , guardian , political science , subversion , liberal democracy , public administration , political economy , law and economics , law , democracy , sociology , politics , computer science , programming language , algorithm
This article discusses the regulation of interest groups by the state in four democracies: two liberal, namely Australia and Canada, and two nonliberal, namely Israel and Turkey. The analysis centers on five questions: the scope of regulation, its causes, public reaction to regulation, implementation of regulation, and its impact on state and society. The article suggests that the type of regime does make a difference regarding all parameters of regulation. Liberal democracies tend to regulate strategy of interest groups; regulation is caused by fear of undue associational pressure exerted on decision‐makers. The public tends to be hostile to regulation; implementation is strict, but impact on both interest groups and society is modest. Nonliberal democracies tend to regulate interest groups' structure. Regulation is caused by fear of subversion and threats to the state's survival. The public is compliant disregarding regulation. Implementation is lax and impact may be potentially substantial. These hypotheses were largely confirmed in the four cases under consideration.