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A Critical Reexamination of Default Logic, Autoepistemic Logic, and Only Knowing
Author(s) -
Halpern Joseph Y.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
computational intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Book series
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.353
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1467-8640
pISSN - 0824-7935
ISBN - 3-540-57184-1
DOI - 10.1111/0824-7935.00036
Subject(s) - default logic , autoepistemic logic , non monotonic logic , context (archaeology) , computer science , probabilistic logic network , artificial intelligence , theoretical computer science , cognitive science , mathematics , multimodal logic , description logic , psychology , paleontology , biology
Fifteen years of work on nonmonotonic logic has certainly increased our understanding of the area. However, given a problem in which nonmonotonic reasoning is called for, it is far from clear how one should go about modeling the problem using the various approaches. We explore this issue in the context on two of the best–known approaches, Reiter's default logic and Moore's autoepistemic logic, as well as two related notions of “only knowing,” due to Halpern and Moses and to Levesque. In particular, we return to the original technical definitions given in these papers and examine the extent to which they capture the intuitions they were designed to capture.