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State Court Strategies and Politics during the Appropriations Process
Author(s) -
Douglas James W.,
Hartley Roger E.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
public budgeting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.694
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1540-5850
pISSN - 0275-1100
DOI - 10.1111/0275-1100.00035
Subject(s) - documentation , politics , state (computer science) , process (computing) , political science , key (lock) , public administration , law , law and economics , business , economics , computer science , computer security , algorithm , programming language , operating system
This article explores state court budgetary strategies and their effectiveness in the appropriations process as perceived by key budgeting actors. In general, we find evidence of state judiciaries that try to remain “above politics” when dealing with budget issues. The most important strategies to this effect include submitting realistic requests, providing documentation to support needs, and not using budget “weapons” at their disposal (e.g., writs of mandamus). However, the survey results do indicate that state judiciaries use certain strategies that have a more political tint, such as lobbying by court officials.