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Framing, Uncertainty, and Hostile Communications in a Crisis Experiment
Author(s) -
McDermott Rose,
Cowden Jonathan,
Koopman Cheryl
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
political psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.419
H-Index - 95
eISSN - 1467-9221
pISSN - 0162-895X
DOI - 10.1111/0162-895x.00274
Subject(s) - ambiguity , framing (construction) , adversary , social psychology , framing effect , cognition , psychology , cognitive resource theory , cheap talk , economics , computer security , persuasion , computer science , microeconomics , engineering , structural engineering , neuroscience , programming language
During times of crisis, do cognitive processes shape leaders’ procurement decisions in predictable ways? Drawing on psychological literature, we propose four factors that may have a substantial influence on how much money leaders engaged in ongoing disputes allocate to their military: (1) striving for superiority versus striving for parity in military resources; (2) uncertainty regarding the characteristics of weapons systems; (3) ambiguity regarding the overall capacities of weapons systems; and (4) the tone of messages that adversaries send to one another. The effects of these factors are investigated using a laboratory simulation that combines both experimental and quasi‐experimental elements. The results indicate that striving for superiority has a significant effect on defense spending, as does the tone of an opponent’s message. By way of contrast, neither uncertainty nor ambiguity exerts a statistically discernable impact on the level of defense spending.