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Fregean Senses, Modes of Presentation, and Concepts
Author(s) -
Zalta Edward N.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
noûs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.574
H-Index - 66
eISSN - 1468-0068
pISSN - 0029-4624
DOI - 10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.15
Subject(s) - presentation (obstetrics) , citation , computer science , cognitive science , library science , information retrieval , psychology , medicine , radiology
Ever since Frege postulated senses in [1892] and conceived of them as (containing) modes of presentation, serious studies in the philosophy of language have often appealed to these entities. In the recent philosophy of language and mind, however, the notions of'mode of presentation'and'concept'have become more important. It seems fair to say that much of the theorizing involving senses, modes of presentation, and concepts has taken place at a very general level. Frege never told us what senses are; they were simply stipulated to be entities that play certain roles in his philosophy of language. Philosophers today still work with both senses and modes of presentation without having a systematic and viable theory of them. And although the notion of a concept has been employed in various ways, there are not all that many precise theories of concepts. In this paper, I try to clear away some of the mystery surrounding these three kinds of entities by o ering a precise theory of them. The theory of Fregean senses developed in my previous work will be extended to yield a more general theory of modes of presentation and concepts. Modes of presentation and concepts will be identified, therefore, in terms