Theism and Epistemic Truth‐Equivalences

ETE's are implied by a variety of well known views about truth. To take just a few examples apart from Putnam's: C. S. Peirce equates truth with awhat is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigateo;, William James claims that a@t#rue ideas are those that we can validate, corroborate, and verifyo;, Brand Blanshard holds that atruth consists in coherence @of our ideas#o;, and Crispin Wright holds that truth is superassertibility, or aassertibility which would be du-rable under any possible improvement to one's state of informationo., Each of these views evidently entails that what is true is materially equivalent to what would be believed by rational beings satisfying certain conditions. ~In these ex-amples, the conditions involve having coherent beliefs, or having reached the end of inquiry, or having warrant for one's beliefs that would survive any pos-sible improvement of one's information, etc. !. And since each view purports to tell us what truth is, or what truth consists in, I take it that each furthermore entails that there is a necessary equivalence between what is true and what would be believed by rational beings satisfying these conditions. Plantinga rejects Putnam's equivalence thesis, arguing that HP entails the adis-mal conclusiono that, necessarily, there exists an IRS. He goes on to argue that