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Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation
Author(s) -
Cornelli Francesca,
Goldreich David
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/0022-1082.00407
Subject(s) - equity (law) , investment banking , discretion , business , monetary economics , institutional investor , investment (military) , finance , financial economics , economics , microeconomics , corporate governance , politics , political science , law
In the bookbuilding procedure, an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue. The banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors. We examine the books for 39 international equity issues. We find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids. Regular investors receive favorable allocations, especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed. The investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors.