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Imperfect Competition among Informed Traders
Author(s) -
Back Kerry,
Cao C. Henry,
Willard Gregory A.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/0022-1082.00282
Subject(s) - competition (biology) , imperfect competition , economics , conjecture , private information retrieval , imperfect , microeconomics , mathematical economics , perfect competition , econometrics , mathematics , combinatorics , statistics , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , biology
We analyze competition among informed traders in the continuous‐time Kyle(1985) model, as Foster and Viswanathan (1996) do in discrete time. We explicitly describe the unique linear equilibrium when signals are imperfectly correlated and confirm the conjecture of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) that there is no linear equilibrium when signals are perfectly correlated. One result is that at some date, and at all dates thereafter, the market would have been more informationally efficient had there been a monopolist informed trader instead of competing traders. The relatively large amount of private information remaining near the end of trading causes the market to approach complete illiquidity.