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The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives
Author(s) -
Ackermann Carl,
McEnally Richard,
Ravenscraft David
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/0022-1082.00129
Subject(s) - fund of funds , hedge fund , alternative beta , incentive , global assets under management , business , hedge accounting , open end fund , commodity pool , institutional investor , passive management , finance , economics , microeconomics , corporate governance
Hedge funds display several interesting characteristics that may influence performance, including: flexible investment strategies, strong managerial incentives, substantial managerial investment, sophisticated investors, and limited government oversight. Using a large sample of hedge fund data from 1988–1995, we find that hedge funds consistently outperform mutual funds, but not standard market indices. Hedge funds, however, are more volatile than both mutual funds and market indices. Incentive fees explain some of the higher performance, but not the increased total risk. The impact of six data‐conditioning biases is explored. We find evidence that positive and negative survival‐related biases offset each other.