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Being Hegelian after Danto
Author(s) -
Hilmer Brigitte
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
history and theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.169
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1468-2303
pISSN - 0018-2656
DOI - 10.1111/0018-2656.681998068
Subject(s) - hegelianism , philosophy , epistemology , essentialism , art methodology , intuition , metaphysics , contemporary art , historicity (philosophy) , analytic philosophy , contemporary philosophy , aesthetics , art , art history , performance art , politics , political science , law
In this article I will discuss some systematic issues of Arthur Danto's philosophy of art and art history from a Hegelian perspective. Belonging to “Absolute Spirit,” art can be called a “spiritual kind.” Since spiritual kinds are reflective and self‐determining, they are not susceptible to philosophical definition. Nevertheless, elements of essentialism can be maintained when describing art's historicity and conceptual structure. To this end, “art” can be interpreted as a two‐tier concept: in inherently reflecting its concept, it projects its own conditions into the past, co‐opting “prehistorical” artworks as predecessors and classical examples. Hegel's view of art as conceptually structured in itself can have disenfranchising or reenfranchising consequences: either reducing art to minor philosophy, or acknowledging its privileged access to its own essence. After Danto's detachment of the philosophy of art from aesthetics, Hegel would himself be deprived of the possibility to “define” art by intuition ( Anschauung ). Even if the spirit consists of essential kinds, philosophy is not in a privileged position to establish the essence of art and thus the difference between art and philosophy. Rather, philosophy must acknowledge art as a neighbor (Heidegger) and as partner in a dialogue.