Human Agency and Impersonal Determinants in Historical Causation: A Response to David Lindenfeld

Lindenfeld's proposed reclassification of causes—offered in lieu of a chaos theory applicable to history—yields paradoxical results when applied to the developments that installed Hitler in power, since these would have to rank as “constraining” rather than “empowering” because of his lack of control over them. The “principle of sensitive dependence,” while an admirable aspiration, proves a counsel of perfection beyond reach of the historian when applied to those same events. As to historical explanations in terms of structural, impersonal determinants, these remain ascendant, to the neglect of human agency. Narrative history, which alone can account for both remote and immediate causes, continues to be unfashionable. Explanations in terms of structures and impersonal forces, which can only imply causation, are attractive because they offer historians wide scope for exercise of erudition and arrive at determinants that appear larger and more powerful than mere actions of humans. Where profound developments are to be explained, such interpretations conform to the assumption that their causes must have been profound. Yet countless turning‐points in history, including Hitler's installation in power, were decisively shaped by acts of a few persons. The frustrating difficulty of accounting for individual behavior contributes to the appeal of impersonal, structural explanations. These tend, however, toward a deterministic view of the past which awakens the impression that what happened had to happen. That obscures the openness of past situations and rules out assignment of personal responsibility to individuals, who seem mere pawns of forces beyond their control. A remedy for such deterministic tendencies lies in counterfactual analysis, which, by drawing attention to feasible, but unrealized, alternatives to what happened, can convey the open‐ended qualities of past situations and the importance of contingency.