Premium
Mind and Method in the History of Ideas
Author(s) -
Bevir Mark
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
history and theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.169
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1468-2303
pISSN - 0018-2656
DOI - 10.1111/0018-2656.00009
Subject(s) - presumption , coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) , epistemology , philosophy of language , mythology , focus (optics) , sociology , philosophy , metaphysics , law , physics , theology , optics , quantum mechanics , political science
J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner have led a recent onslaught on the alleged ”myth of coherence“ in the history of ideas. But their criticisms depend on mistaken views of the nature of mind: respectively, a form of social constructionism, and a focus on illocutionary intentions at the expense of beliefs. An investigation of the coherence constraints that do operate on our ascriptions of belief shows historians should adopt a presumption of coherence, concern themselves with coherence, and proceed to reconstruct sets of beliefs as coherent wholes. The history of ideas merges history with aspects of philosophy, where philosophy is understood as the study of the grammar of our concepts.