Was Descartes responsible for the problem of other minds?

Abstract It is customary to present René Descartes as the initiator of the problem of other minds in modern philosophy. Briefly, the other minds problem is this. (1) Our acquaintance with thinking relies on inner observation or introspection. (2) In contrast, our observations of others can only access their body surfaces and behaviour. (3) Therefore, any knowledge claim about the thinking of others can only be basen on uncertain inferences from external behaviour. Addressing key Cartesian passages, I argue that they do not support other‐minds scepticism. The belief that they do follows from the anachronistic projection of Empiricist psychology back onto Cartesian dualism. Wittgensteinian philosophers typically identify Cartesianism as the target of Ludwig Wittgenstein's criticism of mental privacy. However, the more likely target is Bertrand Russell and his Empiricist forebears.