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The role of advertising in the choice between reselling and agency selling
Author(s) -
Sigue Simon,
Gromova Ekaterina
Publication year - 2025
Publication title -
international transactions in operational research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.032
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1475-3995
pISSN - 0969-6016
DOI - 10.1111/itor.13351
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , business , advertising , channel (broadcasting) , microeconomics , marketing , economics , computer science , philosophy , epistemology , computer network
Abstract This article investigates the condition under which a manufacturer and a retailer in a two‐member channel should adopt reselling or agency selling. Three game‐theoretic models in which price and advertising decisions affect consumer demand are analyzed. Contrary to common belief about agency selling, we demonstrate that when manufacturer advertising greatly influences demand, reselling is the only feasible business model. Agency selling should be considered only when manufacturer advertising slightly impacts demand. Consequently, the manufacturer and retailer may prefer any of the three models and their preferences may differ. Agency selling can drive up retail prices and hurt channel members' profits.
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