Open AccessSecure State Estimation of DC Microgrid System under False Data Injection Attack
Author(s) -
Jiawei Mao,
Shenghua Ye,
Tongxiang Li,
Ming Chen,
Bo Chen
Publication year - 2024
Publication title -
ieee access
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587
H-Index - 127
ISSN - 2169-3536
DOI - 10.1109/access.2024.3368876
Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation
In DC microgrids, distributed secondary control plays an important role in maintaining power distribution and voltage recovery. However, distributed control architecture is vulnerable to external attacks, especially false data injection (FDI) attacks. To solve the problem of the controller being attacked, a distributed Kalman filter is proposed to estimate the attack signals and states. In addition, a compensation mechanism is adopted to defend against attacks and improve system resilience. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified in the scenario of time-varying attack and load switching. The results show that the proposed method can effectively suppress potential external attacks and ensure the system’s stability.