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Noise-Augmented Transferability: A Low-Query-Budget Transfer Attack on Android Malware Detectors
Author(s) -
Junji Wu,
Tomohiro Morikawa,
Tatsuya Mori
Publication year - 2025
Publication title -
ieee access
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Magazines
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587
H-Index - 127
eISSN - 2169-3536
DOI - 10.1109/access.2025.3618010
Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation
Machine learning-based Android malware detectors are vulnerable to black-box adversarial attacks, yet existing methods typically suffer from low query efficiency and limited transferability. This study introduces a novel, two-stage transfer attack that systematically enhances adversarial transferability under stringent, query-limited conditions. We propose a new methodology that decomposes adversarial perturbations into model-specific “key perturbations” and transferable “perturbation noise.” By augmenting the minimal key perturbations with strategically sampled perturbation noise, our method generates a diverse set of highly effective adversarial examples. Extensive experiments demonstrate the attack’s potency, achieving evasion rates of up to 99.53% with an extremely low budget of 1-10 hard-label queries. Our method proves its versatility by successfully targeting models trained on both Boolean and Markov Chain-based features, and importantly, in challenging cross-dimensional scenarios where the attacker’s feature knowledge is limited. Furthermore, a case study on VirusTotal confirms its practical efficacy, reducing detection rates of modern malware by commercial engines by up to 49.7%. This work reveals a new class of potent, query-efficient black-box threats, underscoring the urgent need for more robust malware detection defenses.

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