Open AccessAlgorithmic Approach of Majority Voting with Agents’ Inclusiveness for Facility Resource Matching
Author(s) -
Peash Ranjan Saha,
Salimur Choudhury,
Kai Salomaa
Publication year - 2025
Publication title -
ieee access
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Magazines
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587
H-Index - 127
eISSN - 2169-3536
DOI - 10.1109/access.2025.3574286
Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation
In a two-sided matching with preferences, an agent has preferences over the agents from the other side. In a head-to-head election between any two matching, the agent votes for the matching with a better allocation in pairing based on its preference. A matching M is popular when the number of votes for M is not less than the number of votes for any other matching M ′ in such an election. A U -popular matching is introduced recently with a two-sided matching model where U and W are the two sets of agents, but only the preferences of the agents from U are emphasized, and the preferences of the agents from W are ignored. The matching which is popular among the votes of the agents from U is defined as U -popular. We consider such a model for a one-to-one matching where the agents from U have an inclusive mindset and want to integrate the voting decision of the agents from W into their voting process. In parallel, the agents from W rely more on their ranking on the preference list of the agents from U than their own preferences due to the uncertainty involved in the construction of their preferences.We define an inclusive voting model with such a predominant-subordinate agent scenario ( U as predominant, W as subordinate) and prove that the Boston mechanism matching is U -popular under the model. However, it is possible that the U -popular matching is not the choice of the majority of agents. The choice to be neutral is added in the voting process, and the U -neutral matching type is introduced when the majority of agents vote for neutral. We characterize the U -neutral and max-size U -neutral matching under the inclusive voting model and propose a polynomial-time algorithm to determine a max-size U -neutral matching. The experiments we performed with synthetic instances endorse the algorithm based on the theoretical foundations established.