Artificial Noise Physical Layer Security for V2X Joint Radar Communication Systems Based OTFS Waveform | Zendy

Abdelrahman Abushattal | Zendy; Ayhan Yazgan | Zendy

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Artificial Noise Physical Layer Security for V2X Joint Radar Communication Systems Based OTFS Waveform

Author(s) -

Abdelrahman Abushattal,

Ayhan Yazgan

Publication year - 2025

Publication title -

ieee access

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Magazines

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.587

H-Index - 127

eISSN - 2169-3536

DOI - 10.1109/access.2025.3571491

Subject(s) - aerospace , bioengineering , communication, networking and broadcast technologies , components, circuits, devices and systems , computing and processing , engineered materials, dielectrics and plasmas , engineering profession , fields, waves and electromagnetics , general topics for engineers , geoscience , nuclear engineering , photonics and electrooptics , power, energy and industry applications , robotics and control systems , signal processing and analysis , transportation

Joint radar communication (JRC) effectively integrates radar capabilities and data transmission that are used in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) applications.Within the JRC, the transmission suffers from a highly dispersive, time-varying channel due to the mobility environment, while the transmission requires a secure method with low latency and time complexity. The confidential information signal must be resilient to radar user eavesdropping while enabling the radar user to get the correct channel radar estimation image. The main contribution of this paper is to provide security for the JRC system used in V2X application networks by employing Artificial Noise (AN) Physical Layer Security (PLS) with low time complexity constraints, which integrates with the Orthogonal Time Frequency Space (OTFS) waveform that offers robustness against time-varying channel degradation considering the 3GPP TS 36 Extended Vehicular A channel model (EVA). Moreover, the practical implementation considers imperfect channel state information and involves a powerful eavesdropper who can estimate legitimate user channels with a certain amount of error. The secrecy capacity, average bit-error rate (BER), time complexity, and execution time results present the performance of the proposed AN scheme and its ability to protect legitimate users’ information in a promising manner while providing the radar user with sufficient quality of service (QoS), where the proposed approach provides a secrecy capacity level up to 7 nats/symbol with an execution time that is 42 times faster than the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and 6.4 thousand times better than Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptographic algorithms.

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