Open AccessImproving environment drives dynamical change in social game structure
Author(s) -
Erika Chiba,
Diane Carmeliza N. Cuaresma,
Jomar F. Rabajante,
Jerrold M. Tubay,
Maica Krizna Areja Gavina,
Tatsuki Yamamoto,
Jin Yoshimura,
Satoru Morita,
Hiromu Ito,
Takuya Okabe
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
royal society open science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.84
H-Index - 51
ISSN - 2054-5703
DOI - 10.1098/rsos.201166
Subject(s) - dilemma , prisoner's dilemma , game theory , computer science , mathematical economics , value (mathematics) , repeated game , sequential game , non cooperative game , cover (algebra) , social dilemma , microeconomics , mathematics , economics , machine learning , engineering , mechanical engineering , geometry
The development of cooperation in human societies is a major unsolved problem in biological and social sciences. Extensive studies in game theory have shown that cooperative behaviour can evolve only under very limited conditions or with additional complexities, such as spatial structure. Non-trivial two-person games are categorized into three types of games, namely, the prisoner's dilemma game, the chicken game and the stag hunt game. Recently, the weight-lifting game has been shown to cover all five games depending on the success probability of weight lifting, which include the above three games and two trivial cases (all cooperation and all defection; conventionally not distinguished as separate classes). Here, we introduce the concept of the environmental value of a society. Cultural development and deterioration are represented by changes in this probability. We discuss cultural evolution in human societies and the biological communities of living systems.