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ACADEMIC TENURE, POSTTENURE EFFORT, AND CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES
Author(s) -
Dnes Antony,
Garoupa Nuno
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1093/ei/cbi061
Subject(s) - damages , incentive , economics , revelation , labour economics , microeconomics , public economics , law , political science , art , literature
In this article we explore the incentive properties of academic tenure relative to alternatives that might be substitutes for tenure, in particular contractual damages. We emphasize the role of tenure in providing an incentive for incumbent faculty to reveal the characteristics of recruits and to maintain their own performance posttenure. Our results suggest that tenure is just one of many mechanisms potentially able to achieve honest revelation. (JEL I2 , K0 , L2 )