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BELIEFS ABOUT OTHER‐REGARDING PREFERENCES IN A SEQUENTIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAME
Author(s) -
COATS JENNIFER C.,
NEILSON WILLIAM S.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1093/ei/cbi042
Subject(s) - public good , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , economics , public goods game , first mover advantage , microeconomics , point (geometry) , inequality , positive economics , social psychology , psychology , mathematics , industrial organization , mathematical analysis , geometry
Experimental evidence is used to deduce players' beliefs about their opponents' concern for others. The experiment is a sequential public good provision game with a provision point and two different refund rules. A theory is constructed to show how early contributions should change with the refund rule depending on the first mover's beliefs about subsequent players' other‐regarding preferences. The evidence rejects the hypothesis that early players believe that their opponents are inequality averse and also rejects the hypothesis that early players are concerned with security. The evidence is consistent with beliefs in spite, reciprocity, or a concern for security. (JEL H41 , C90 , D63 , D64 )