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EXTERNAL THREAT AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
Author(s) -
NIOU EMERSON M. S.,
Tan Guofu
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1093/ei/cbi035
Subject(s) - rivalry , offensive , collective action , context (archaeology) , action (physics) , economics , free riding , microeconomics , law and economics , positive economics , political science , law , management , politics , paleontology , physics , quantum mechanics , incentive , biology
This article studies how players allocate their endowed resources between productive and conflictual activities in the context of rivalry between two groups. We show that the suboptimality and exploitation propositions established by Olson (1965) do not necessarily apply when external threat is endogenized. We also illustrate that it does not always pay to take an offensive stance. When competing with an offensive group, it might be better for members of a defensive group to remain defensive. Furthermore, in the context of rivalry between two groups, free riding can actually benefit everyone in the system. (JEL D70 , D74 )