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Premium Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality When Buyers do not Know the Sellers' Cost?
Author(s)
Rasmusen Eric B.,
Perri Timothy J.
Publication year2001
Publication title
economic inquiry
Resource typeJournals
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
The 1981 Klein‐Leffler model of product quality does not explain why high‐quality firms would dissipate the rents they earn from quality‐assuring price premia, and it relies on consumers knowing the cost functions of firms. In the present article, consumers do not know any firm's cost of producing quality goods, so firms with a low cost of producing high quality engage in conspicuous spending to demonstrate they earn a profitable mark‐up over cost. Complete rent dissipation does occur if such firms have the same cost of producing low‐quality items as other firms that are worse at producing high quality.
Subject(s)business , commerce , economics , epistemology , geometry , industrial organization , mathematics , microeconomics , philosophy , product (mathematics) , quality (philosophy)
Language(s)English
SCImago Journal Rank0.823
H-Index72
eISSN1465-7295
pISSN0095-2583
DOI10.1093/ei/39.4.561

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