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Majoritarian Management of the Commons
Author(s) -
Buchanan James M.,
Yoon Yong J.
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1093/ei/39.3.396
Subject(s) - commons , economics , microeconomics , oligopoly , incentive , cournot competition , argument (complex analysis) , common pool resource , interdependence , relevance (law) , value (mathematics) , duopoly , resource (disambiguation) , law and economics , public economics , computer science , political science , computer network , biochemistry , chemistry , machine learning , law
This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, “the commons,” under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common resource, total value is dissipated, but the interdependencies introduced by possible membership in differing coalitions to an extent reduce the incentives for exploitation. The formal analysis is analogous to that familiar in Cournot‐Nash duopoly‐oligopoly models but with differing efficiency implications. The argument has relevance for differential‐benefit public spending from general tax sources, as well as other applications.