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Do Regulators Respond to Voluntary Pollution Control Efforts? A Count Data Analysis
Author(s) -
Decker Christopher S.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1093/cep/byi014
Subject(s) - turnover , business , statutory law , unit (ring theory) , environmental regulation , control (management) , economics , operations management , public economics , management , political science , law , mathematics education , mathematics
This article addresses whether environmental regulators are responsive to voluntary environmental behavior. Mixed results are obtained. In two of four frequently inspected manufacturing industries, state regulators do indeed undertake fewer current inspections at those plants that report lower per unit output Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) chemical releases. Moreover, regulated pollutant releases and statutory compliance history also influence inspection activity. Finally, in the pulp and paper industry, plants that account for a larger share of state manufacturing employment are inspected less frequently. In other sectors, this appears not to be the case. (JEL K32 , L51 , Q21 )