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A COST‐BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENLARGING THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Author(s) -
Kinoshita Tomio
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1093/cep/20.2.179
Subject(s) - economics , income elasticity of demand , cost–benefit analysis , supply and demand , present value , price elasticity of demand , microeconomics , law , finance , political science
This article presents a cost‐benefit analysis of enlarging the Japanese judicial system, especially the civil section of District Courts (CSDC). Constructing a simple econometric model of CSDC, the effects of increase of judges on the supply of judicial services and the trial time are analyzed. Then a cost and benefit calculation is done. The basic assumption is that the total benefit of the judicial system is the aggregate of monetary value of a suit (MVS). The main conclusions are: (1) The demand elasticity for a civil trial with respect to trial time is – 1.3 to about – 1.4 , and its income elasticity is 0.95. (2) The supply of civil trials is proportional to the number of judges. (3) Ten‐percent increase of judges will shorten the average trial time by 5.2%. (4) The net benefit of CSDC is estimated to be ¥466 billion per year if the annual discount rate is 10%. (5) Judging from the demand and supply relation, if CSDC is doubled, the net increase of total benefit per year will be ¥543 billion. (6) If the benefit of the external effect on lawyers' market is added, the total net benefit will reach almost ¥1 trillion, which is 0.22% of gross domestic product.