Open AccessNot knowing you know: a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge
Author(s) -
John Williams
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.452
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-8284
pISSN - 0003-2638
DOI - 10.1093/analys/anv017
Subject(s) - defeasible reasoning , epistemology , philosophy , agnosticism , expressivism , skepticism , zeno's paradoxes , reasonable doubt , law , political science
Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these
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