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An Efficient Nonmarket Institution under Imperfect Markets: Labor Sharing for Tropical Forest Clearing
Author(s) -
Takasaki Yoshito,
Coomes Oliver T.,
Abizaid Christian,
Brisson Stéphanie
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
american journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.949
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1467-8276
pISSN - 0002-9092
DOI - 10.1093/ajae/aat102
Subject(s) - nonmarket forces , economics , productivity , clearing , labour economics , institution , personnel economics , labor demand , imperfect , secondary labor market , factor market , labor relations , microeconomics , wage , economic growth , linguistics , philosophy , finance , political science , law
This article examines the substitutability, productivity, efficiency, and evolution of an important agrarian nonmarket institution—labor sharing. Analysis of field‐level data on forest clearing through time among Amazonian shifting cultivators reveals that ( a ) family, hired, and cooperative labor are perfect substitutes, and hired and cooperative labor are equally productive, and both are more productive than family labor; ( b ) the combination of labor market and labor sharing makes productivity‐adjusted total labor use unconstrained by household and network endowments (i.e., efficient labor allocation); and ( c ) as labor composition is constrained by network endowments and liquidity, credit policies alter both labor composition and labor network formation.