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The Paternalist Meets His Match
Author(s) -
Lusk Jayson L.,
Marette Stephan,
Norwood F. Bailey
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
applied economic perspectives and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.4
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 2040-5804
pISSN - 2040-5790
DOI - 10.1093/aepp/ppt031
Subject(s) - paternalism , scope (computer science) , freedom of choice , value (mathematics) , phenomenon , economics , positive economics , social psychology , public economics , psychology , epistemology , philosophy , machine learning , computer science , programming language , market economy
Despite the frequent arguments that findings from behavioral economics experiments justify paternalism, there is scant evidence of how people (the paternalists) make decisions for others or how the recipients of paternalism (the paternalees) respond to decisions made for them. Using data from over 300 people recruited from two cities in the United States and France, we study how choices between a relatively healthy item (apples) and a relatively unhealthy item (cookies) are influenced by one's role as either the paternalist or the paternalee. We find that after being provided information on nutritional content, but not before, paternalists make healthier choices for the paternalees than for themselves. Surprisingly, prior to being provided information, paternalees desire healthier choices than they expect the paternalists to give, a phenomenon that seems to arise from a type of egotism where individuals believe they make healthier choices than everyone else. Results in both locations reveal that more than 75% of paternalees prefer their own choices compared to the ones made for them by the paternalists, and are willing to pay non‐trivial amounts to have their own choices. Any intrinsic value people place on the freedom of choice must be weighed against whatever benefits might arise from paternalistic policies, and consequently the scope for paternalism may be narrower than is often purported.