Open AccessWill Enterprises Choose Low-carbon Production Technology? Evolutionary Game Model Considering Consumers’ Environmental Protection Moral and Market Clearing
Author(s) -
Jialin Zheng,
Zhou Yunlong
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iop conference series. materials science and engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1757-899X
pISSN - 1757-8981
DOI - 10.1088/1757-899x/790/1/012126
Subject(s) - production (economics) , clearing , business , market clearing , carbon fibers , selection (genetic algorithm) , evolutionarily stable strategy , industrial organization , game theory , environmental economics , commerce , microeconomics , economics , computer science , finance , algorithm , artificial intelligence , composite number
Considering that manufacturing enterprises have two production strategies, one is traditional production strategy, and the other is low-carbon production strategy. Consumers have environmental protection moral, they are composed of green consumers and non-green consumers. In addition, enterprises are bounded rational. Based on this, we constructed an evolutionary game model of low-carbon production strategy selection, and analyzed the conditions for achieving the evolutionary stable equilibrium (ESS). Furthermore, the co-evolution of the proportion of companies adopting low-carbon strategy and the proportion of green consumers is also analyzed.