Open AccessPricing and Incentive Mechanism for Green Building Supply Chain with Reference price
Author(s) -
Wen Jiang,
Xiaoyan Huang,
Meilin Liu
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iop conference series. materials science and engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1757-899X
pISSN - 1757-8981
DOI - 10.1088/1757-899x/780/6/062033
Subject(s) - incentive , profit maximization , profit (economics) , supply chain , microeconomics , reference price , industrial organization , mechanism (biology) , business , green building , environmental economics , maximization , economics , marketing , engineering , architectural engineering , philosophy , epistemology
Based on the stackable game theory, this paper studies the pricing and incentive mechanism of a two-echelon green building supply chain consisting of a developer and a contractor. We build the profit maximization models of the developer and the contractor for three scenarios that without reference price and incentive mechanism, with the reference price but no incentive mechanism and with the reference price and incentive mechanism. Then study the optimal decisions of the developer and the contractor in different situations. The results show that introducing incentive mechanism and reference price into building supply chain pricing can effectively increase the profit of developers and contractors. In addition, it can also improve the level of green buildings and promote the sustainable development of the construction industry. Finally, the sensitivity analysis shows that the optimal pricing increases as the initial reference price increases; The optimal pricing, incentive intensity and green building level are increasing in initial green building level and decreasing in increment cost coefficient.