Open AccessGame Analysis of Project General Contracting Rent-seeking
Author(s) -
Lianhua Cheng,
Ziyue Wang,
Yanhua Zhang
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
iop conference series. materials science and engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1757-899X
pISSN - 1757-8981
DOI - 10.1088/1757-899x/592/1/012122
Subject(s) - rent seeking , government (linguistics) , business , mechanism (biology) , value (mathematics) , space (punctuation) , microeconomics , public economics , economics , computer science , philosophy , linguistics , epistemology , machine learning , politics , political science , law , operating system
It is important to clearly understand the rent-seeking behavior of all parties involved in the general contracting mode. First, the formation mechanism of rent-seeking was analyzed. Then, the game model of the owners, general contractors, supervision units, government and society during the operation of the general contracting project was proposed, to explore the decision-making space and behavior mechanism of relevant stakeholders. Finally, the optimal decision-making of the game players under different situations was discussed. The results show that the general contractor and supervision rent-seeking probability is affected by the owner’s supervision cost and supervision probability; the probability of owner supervision is related to the ability of owner and government public to supervise and punish rent-seeking behavior; and the ability of government and public to supervise is related to the cost of supervision and the reward value of supervision success.