Open AccessImpossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Surge
Author(s) -
Zhiqiang Qu,
Xuan Shen,
Jun He
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iop conference series. earth and environmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.179
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1755-1307
pISSN - 1755-1315
DOI - 10.1088/1755-1315/440/5/052086
Subject(s) - block cipher , impossible differential cryptanalysis , differential cryptanalysis , higher order differential cryptanalysis , linear cryptanalysis , computer science , differential (mechanical device) , cryptanalysis , boomerang attack , algorithm , arithmetic , computer security , theoretical computer science , mathematics , cryptography , engineering , aerospace engineering
In 2018, Li Lang et al. proposed a new lightweight block cipher which is called Surge. Its block size is 64-bit, and the length of key size is 64/80/128-bit, respectively. They also proved that the cipher has good performance on security and effectively resists on differential attack, linear attack and algebraic attack. In this paper, some 4-round impossible differentials are constructed with the miss-in-the-middle method. Furthermore, 6-round impossible differential attacks are proposed on Surge- 64/Surge-80/Surge-128 algorithms based on the 4-round impossible differentials. The data complexity of the attack is 2 38 /2 39 /2 39.5 chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is 2 51.4 /2 51.7 /2 60.9 6-round encryptions, and the storage complexity is 2 40 /2 40.1 /2 49 storage units. This is the first time to make the impossible differential cryptanalysis for Surge.