Open AccessEvolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Entry Decision of Manufacturers and Distributors
Author(s) -
Wei Yang
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
iop conference series. earth and environmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.179
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1755-1307
pISSN - 1755-1315
DOI - 10.1088/1755-1315/440/2/022040
Subject(s) - remanufacturing , profit (economics) , supply chain , industrial organization , business , nash equilibrium , competition (biology) , context (archaeology) , authorization , game theory , operations management , computer science , microeconomics , operations research , manufacturing engineering , economics , marketing , engineering , ecology , paleontology , computer security , biology
The economic and environmental benefits of remanufacturing have been widely recognized.In the context of competition between manufacturers and distributors in closed-loop supply chain.The dynamic evolution process of manufacturer and distributor’s remanufacturing decision-making is analyzed by evolutionary game model. By analyzing the stability of the system, the optimal strategy combination is obtained. The results show that the equilibrium results of system evolution are affected by the authorization fees paid by distributors to manufacturers, the difficulty of recycling remanufactured products and the technical level. When the relationship between profit and authorization fees of remanufactured products changes, the system will evolve to different equilibrium. Finally, the correlation is verified by numerical simulation. Conclusion.