
Research on renewable energy incentive policy based on evolutionary game
Author(s) -
Wenyan Zhang,
QiaoMei Liang,
Chuansheng Xie,
Yao Luo
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
iop conference series earth and environmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.179
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1755-1307
pISSN - 1755-1315
DOI - 10.1088/1755-1315/344/1/012170
Subject(s) - subsidy , incentive , renewable energy , status quo , government (linguistics) , industrial organization , business , production (economics) , environmental economics , public economics , microeconomics , economics , natural resource economics , market economy , engineering , linguistics , philosophy , electrical engineering
In view of the current policy design, which is created to influence the growth of the renewable energy sector, the status quo of different subjects’ role orientation and behaviour mechanism is neglected. This paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the three parties in the renewable energy industry involved: government, enterprise and consumer. The results show that the initial stage of government incentive policies should increase subsidies to enterprises and increase price incentives for consumers. At the same time, enterprises must actively respond to the call of the state. With the further advancement of the policy, the government should reduce subsidies to enterprises appropriately, and urge enterprises to develop production technologies for renewable energy vigorously to reduce the operation of enterprises’ cost. The results can provide theoretical reference and realistic support for the government.
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