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Signalling Game of Online Store Quality Based on Service Recovery
Author(s) -
Hongzhen Lei,
Honghong Zhang,
Dan Lü
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
iop conference series. earth and environmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1755-1307
pISSN - 1755-1315
DOI - 10.1088/1755-1315/332/4/042007
Subject(s) - information asymmetry , mainstream , service (business) , quality (philosophy) , bayesian game , computer science , signalling , process (computing) , signaling game , service quality , signal (programming language) , bayesian probability , advertising , game theory , business , sequential game , marketing , microeconomics , artificial intelligence , economics , philosophy , operating system , theology , finance , epistemology , programming language
Changing attitudes of consumers shopping, online shopping has gradually become the mainstream. However, because of the characteristics of online shopping, there is information asymmetry in the process of trading, which makes it hard for customers to identify quality of online stores, causing a series of service failure. To solve this problem, this study regards the online store and customers as the game sides, and the level of service recovery as a signal, and establishes a signalling game model, under the three different relations of the two types of online store service failure probabilities, three Bayesian Equilibria of signal game is analyzed, and the only existence condition of the separating equilibrium is given respectively in three situation, and the countermeasures of online stores and customers in the case of information asymmetry are obtained.

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