Open AccessGame model of three-party shared risk allocation for PPP projects ---based on the perspective of incomplete information
Author(s) -
Zhang Pei-pei,
Kuo Zhan,
Ying Zhou
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
iop conference series. earth and environmental science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.179
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1755-1307
pISSN - 1755-1315
DOI - 10.1088/1755-1315/295/4/042049
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , business , perspective (graphical) , government (linguistics) , game theory , complete information , bargaining problem , key (lock) , private information retrieval , incomplete contracts , signaling game , microeconomics , actuarial science , finance , economics , computer science , computer security , linguistics , philosophy , artificial intelligence , incentive
PPP projects involve multi-stakeholders. Rational allocation of risk among project participants is the basis and key to the smooth operation of PPP projects. In the past, most of the studies have only considered the public and private parties, but ignored the bank as the project participant to share the project risk. Therefore, using the bargaining game theory, this paper bulids a bargaining game model in which the three parties (government, enterprise and bank) of PPP project deter each other under incomplete information, and works out the corresponding sub-game refined Nash equilibrium, then obtains the proportion of risk sharing among the three participants. The research results provide a scientific basis for project participants to make decision on risk sharing, which is conducive to improving the willingness of project participants to cooperate, and also play a supplementary role in PPP project risk sharing research.