Open AccessA survey of offensive security research on PLCs
Author(s) -
Rongkuan Ma,
Qiang Wei,
Qingxian Wang
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1976/1/012025
Subject(s) - offensive , computer security , computer science , work (physics) , core (optical fiber) , programmable logic controller , industrial control system , control (management) , engineering , telecommunications , operations research , operating system , artificial intelligence , mechanical engineering
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are widely deployed in critical infrastructures, such as electric power, water filtration and distribution. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) work as the core components of an ICS. The offensive security technology of PLCs has attracted the popular interests of both attackers and researchers. In this paper, we firstly abstract a 4-layers model of PLC’s implementation, and then summarize and classify attacks against PLCs into 5 types. Further, we point out the features and trends of the related attack studies, which is helpful to promote the research in the ICS security community and provide vital suggestions for defenders.