Open AccessWhether Executive Incentives Restrain Corporate Violations: An Empirical Study Based on the Statistical Data of Listed Companies
Author(s) -
Dong Li,
Quanhong Liu
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1955/1/012035
Subject(s) - incentive , corporate governance , salary , shareholder , executive compensation , business , accounting , equity (law) , order (exchange) , principal–agent problem , principal (computer security) , compensation (psychology) , finance , economics , microeconomics , market economy , operating system , psychology , political science , computer science , psychoanalysis , law
Corporate violation of listed company has always been one of the researches focuses in the field of corporate governance, and executive incentives are considered to be an effective way to solve the principal-agent problem. This paper uses 454 companies that were publicized in the A-share market due to corporate violation in 2013-2017 as the research objects to explore the impact of salary incentives and equity incentives on listed companies’ violations, and explore the adjustment of the above-mentioned influence mechanism by the gender and age of executives’ effect. The study found that the compensation and equity incentives provided by shareholders of listed companies to executives can effectively suppress the violations of listed companies. Female executives can strengthen the inhibitory effect more than men, and the older the executives, the more the inhibitory effect can be strengthened.