Open AccessProbabilistic switching can solve the problem of costly prosocial exclusion
Author(s) -
Weiwei Xie,
Hongye Liu,
Fangfang Gao,
Jie-Ru Zhang
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1903/1/012020
Subject(s) - tragedy of the commons , outcome (game theory) , mathematical economics , yield (engineering) , state (computer science) , prosocial behavior , public goods game , economics , computer science , mathematics , public good , microeconomics , commons , psychology , social psychology , physics , ecology , algorithm , biology , thermodynamics
Public Goods Game (PGG) originates from “the Tragedy of Commons”, which is argued by the American scholar Hardin. PGG is a type of evolution game that these individuals in this game can affect each other, and reached a stable state. This paper demonstrates a new version PGG model which is an exclusion PGG model. Besides, combing Parrondo’s Paradox with this PGG model, and it also shows a similar “winning” outcome. Parrondo’s Paradox shows that two individual-losing games, when alternate, yield a winning outcome. Moreover, the additional periodic switching mechanism also applies to the PGG model and obtains a similar result when compared with that of conventional Parrondo’s Paradox. The biggest contribution of this paper is that Parrondo’s Paradox can fully applicable to the exclusion PGG model, and that simulation result also presents an effective result.