Open AccessIntercept-resend attack on passive side channel of the light source in BB84 decoy-state protocol
Author(s) -
D. V. Babukhin,
Denis Sych
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1695/1/012119
Subject(s) - quantum key distribution , bb84 , side channel attack , channel (broadcasting) , key (lock) , protocol (science) , computer science , quantum cryptography , computer security , computer network , physics , quantum , cryptography , quantum mechanics , quantum information , medicine , alternative medicine , pathology
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communication based on fundamental laws of physics, though practical realizations of QKD may have loopholes and side channels, thus their security can be compromised. We analyze the intercept-resend attack on the BB84 decoy-state protocol under the presence of a passive side channel of the light source. We derive an upper bound for the secret key rate and show that it does not significantly deviate from the ideal side-channel-free case.