Open AccessMultiplayer Repeated Game of Environmental Protection between Government and Enterprises
Author(s) -
Yuan Tang,
Yuanyuan Huang
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1621/1/012111
Subject(s) - incentive , government (linguistics) , business , environmental pollution , game theory , investment (military) , sequential game , mechanism (biology) , industrial organization , environmental economics , non cooperative game , win win game , microeconomics , economics , environmental protection , political science , linguistics , philosophy , environmental science , epistemology , politics , law
An important source of environmental pollution in our country is industrial enterprises, which have caused great damage to the ecological environment. The government continues to pay more attention to environmental protection, while enterprises aim to maximize their own interests, to the detriment of the overall social interests. We propose a probability game with economic incentive mechanism between government and polluting enterprises. In the game, each enterprise decides whether to invest in environmental protection. Considering the benefits of selfish enterprises, local governments, as managers, adopt a zero determinant (ZD) strategy for enterprises. This strategy has played an important role in minimizing social costs. It has introduced the entire society’s environmental protection investment into the game. We simulate the game model to evaluate the performance of the ZD strategy numerically.