Open AccessResearch on Institutional Invalidation Caused by “Potential Rules”
Author(s) -
Yu Wang,
Tao Ding
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1584/1/012065
Subject(s) - perspective (graphical) , institution , game theory , repeated game , subject (documents) , computer science , microeconomics , economics , artificial intelligence , political science , law , library science
Through the simulation study of multi-equilibrium game with “Potential Rule” strategy, we find that the behaviour of “Potential rule” can be evolved through repeated game without considering any other social preferences of the subject and any prior knowledge of the game. This paper will analyse the endogenous evolution of the third strategy, namely the “Potential Rules”, between the choices of fair and unfair strategies from the perspective of interest transmission. The experimental results show that the subjects who own the third strategy with the characteristics of “Potential Rules” will spread to other subjects in a certain institutional environment by imitating learning and adjusting strategies. The third strategy will become a guide to the behaviour of the subjects and form a deviation of the institution, which will lead to institutional failure.