Open AccessGame Problem and Nash Equilibrium in the Electronic Payment Market with Multi-agent Participation
Author(s) -
Qiudan Xing,
Jin Ma
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
journal of physics. conference series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.21
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1742-6596
pISSN - 1742-6588
DOI - 10.1088/1742-6596/1486/6/062011
Subject(s) - payment , payment service provider , payment order , nash equilibrium , competition (biology) , business , database transaction , game theory , service (business) , electronic money , e commerce , service provider , payment system , the internet , contradiction , commerce , microeconomics , computer science , economics , marketing , finance , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , world wide web , programming language , biology
The rapid development of e-commerce has greatly promoted the popularization of electronic payment methods in China. The electronic payment service of online banking solves the problem of online transaction payment in the early stage of e-commerce development. After the rise of third-party Internet-guaranteed payment services, the problem of mutual trust in online shopping was solved in a breakthrough way, and the electronic payment service model was continuously innovated, and the electronic payment service scene was rapidly expanded and popularized. In this process, the relationship between third-party payment service providers and online banking has evolved from cooperation to competition, and has been developing in the contradiction between competition and cooperation. At the same time, the third-party payment model has brought great challenges to financial supervision. Based on the respective interests of the main participants in the electronic payment market, this paper applies game theory and its Nash equilibrium theory to analyze the optimal strategy choices of the participating entities in the electronic payment market, and gives their respective development strategies.