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Persuasion via Weak Institutions
Author(s) -
Elliot Lipnowski,
Ravid Doron,
Denis Shishkin
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
journal of political economy
Language(s) - Uncategorized
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 21.034
H-Index - 186
eISSN - 1537-534X
pISSN - 0022-3808
DOI - 10.1086/720462
Subject(s) - communication source , persuasion , stochastic game , mathematical economics , function (biology) , value (mathematics) , microeconomics , computer science , economics , econometrics , mathematics , statistics , telecommunications , social psychology , psychology , evolutionary biology , biology

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