Open AccessContract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information
Author(s) -
Albert H. Choi,
George G. Triantis
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
the journal of legal studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.251
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1537-5366
pISSN - 0047-2530
DOI - 10.1086/716173
Subject(s) - inefficiency , negotiation , investment (military) , damages , private information retrieval , ex ante , business , incomplete contracts , information asymmetry , microeconomics , economics , industrial organization , law , incentive , statistics , mathematics , politics , political science , macroeconomics
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