Dual Labor Markets, Efficiency Wages, and Search
Author(s) -
James Albrecht,
Susan Vroman
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
journal of labor economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 8.184
H-Index - 109
eISSN - 1537-5307
pISSN - 0734-306X
DOI - 10.1086/298295
Subject(s) - dual (grammatical number) , economics , efficiency wage , dualism , labour economics , wage , outcome (game theory) , ex ante , microeconomics , dual economy , secondary labor market , labor relations , market economy , macroeconomics , art , literature , philosophy , epistemology
This article presents an equilibrium model of a dual labor market. Firms are assumed to be identical ex ante, and dualism arises endogenously. The dual labor market outcome is supported by efficiency wage and search considerations. Firms choose wage/effort requirement packages optimally given optimal search and effort choice by workers, and vice versa. We prove existence and investigate the occurrence and nature of dual labor market equilibria.
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